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Living With 
the Dead
Sharkfeed and the Extending 
Ontologies of New Media
John Grech
This article examines how new media are helping to actualise new forms of “being” and “know-
ing” by mixing realities of the virtual and the real. The blending of archival and contemporary ma-
terial in a Web installation called Sharkfeed provides a context for this discussion. Themes such as
death, memory, past and present, and mind and body provide the critical fissures through which
to move beyond older theoretical paradigms and examine the emerging possibilities of the social
particularities and cultural practices engendered in the interconnected time spaces of a digital era.
This article explores death in relation to new media in an effort to consider what it
means to live in a digital age, a world of structures, networks, and communities made
out of real as well as virtual spaces. In exploring this world, I will refer to a Web site
called Sharkfeed, a project I was invited to do by the Australian Broadcasting Corpo-
ration (ABC) in 1997 and that was completed by Wobbegong Productions1 in con-
junction with the Australian Film Commission and launched on ABC On-Line in July
2000.
Claude Lefort commenced the “Forward” to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible
and the Invisible (1968) by recounting the story of the unexpected and premature
death of the author. It is somewhat ironic, then, that what is arguably Merleau-Ponty’s
most challenging work was to be published posthumously as an edited compendium
of unfinished notes, sketches, and thoughts by his friend. That being the case, one of
the greatest problems in editing the book, as Lefort admitted, was how to deal with the
traces of Merleau-Ponty’s invisible hand. Lefort finally resolved this by leaving it to the
Author’s Note: The URL for this project is http://www.abc.net.au/sharkfeed.
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reader to complete the text. There is no greater irony in this book, therefore, than the
fact that Merleau-Ponty, who was centrally concerned with notions of invisibility and
disappearance, became invisible himself.
Death is a terribly final act! There is nothing after it, no encore, no final round of
applause or critical praise. No final expression of love or appreciation can follow the
dead into the grave. The disappearance of an author, an originator, a creator, as living
being, seems to be an ultimate, insurmountable form of “other”-ing that dwarfs all
other differences we experience as moderns. We, the living, can never know what the
dead know until we know death ourselves. But once dead, we cannot communicate
what we know back to the living. Nor can we return to complete a great unfinished
work. Or so it seems! Yet if we could understand death, would we not begin to under-
stand what it means to be inseparably part of the world at the same time as being per-
manently separated from it? Is death not a continuum of life?
Haunting Virtual Space
There is no place that is not haunted by many different spirits hidden there in si-
lence. . . . Haunted places are the only ones people can live in.
—Michel de Certeau (The Practice of Everyday Life, 1988, p. 108)
Sharkfeed is about the kidnapping and death in 1960 of a young schoolboy named
Graeme Thorne who lived in the Sydney beachside suburb of Bondi. The site brings
together captured film stills from ABC’s television archives, photographs of Sydney
made during the 1980s and 1990s, newspaper reports, narrative accounts, along with
analytic and interpretive texts compiled by the cowriters, Matthew Leonard and my-
self. In addition, Matthew provided the original sound design for the project, whereas
I provided the artistic direction and contemporary images. The project thus combines
contemporary and archival material (written, aural, and visual) to produce a virtual
environment where some of the myths and memories haunting the lived spaces of
Sydney today come alive.
Sharkfeed explores how the death of a young boy led to the creation of a whole new
universe, a side-real world that, on one hand, is barred from the living, but that, on the
other, continues to coexist with the living. For although the death of Graeme Thorne
is an undeniable tragedy to those closely connected to him, in dying, Graeme entered
into the cultural imaginary of the Australian psyche. Thus, instead of becoming a typ-
ical Sydney-sider leading what would probably have been a comfortable but perhaps
mundane life, Thorne continues to exist today as an extraordinary figure in an imag-
inary nation Peter Peirce (1999) saw fit to name The Country of the Lost Children. That
land is today full of wandering children, missing children, as well as other lost people,
whose actual physical fate has never impeded the fantastic roles they are asked to play
in the community’s dreaming space. Through these fantasy plays are woven the nar-
ratives, myths, and tales that community wishes to tell itself, about itself, and for itself.
Echoed in many parts of the Western world, the Graeme Thorne myth is rich with sto-
ries of “stranger danger”; the fear of the other; the desire for money; the pursuit of
progress; faith in technology, science, and reason; and the myth of childhood. These
are some of the imaginary realms Sharkfeed conjures up.
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If Sharkfeed were made up of only archival material though, it would have re-
mained encapsulated as a mythical imaginary—a social history. With the generation
of contemporary material, these imaginary realms are situated back into the concrete
present, the real. This brings it back to life as a hybrid reality that I want to explore fur-
ther. But first, let me indicate some methodological parameters in the project.
The Artistic Directions in Sharkfeed
There are two theoretical elements that underpin Sharkfeed. One is the notion of
documentary—the use of material evidence like photographs, historical accounts, and
eyewitness reports to assemble authoritative, truthful narratives about real events. In
“The Domain of Documentary,” Bill Nichols (1991) showed how documentaries have
assembled an array of languages to do this. Yet one thing remains clear—documen-
taries use material objects to testify and verify the truth. The Fontana Dictionary of
Modern Thought (Bullock, Stallybrass, & Trombley, 1988) spoke of “materialism” as a
theory in which there must be some form of material trace or object (testified to by it
being seen or touched) to verify that event or thing really exists. Truth is then asserted
in narratives and other linguistic descriptions derived from such objects.
Yet Sharkfeed undermines its own basic premise about documentary and particu-
larly the faith in material objects. For years, we have known that photographs pre-
sented as evidence can be readily manipulated by the judicious use of captions, narra-
tives, as well as the selective use of other objects and images. This is further
complicated by digital technologies capacity to forge and fake things. New media blow
away whatever credibility photography had to represent events as they really were. Yet
still, Sharkfeed trades on ideas of the representation of truth by presenting things like
photographs as evidence.
One way to overcome the problem is to abandon the idea that reality is an objec-
tive, material phenomenon that may be represented by objects such as photographs,
which are then used to support particular narratives about reality. This is not to say
that things are not real, however, or that we are reduced to telling relativist stories in
which one point of view is cancelled out by any other. We know that Graeme Thorne
really existed and that he really died as a consequence of his kidnapper’s actions. But
that is not the same as saying that the kidnapper intended to kill Thorne. Causality of
events, when asserted through material objects alone, does not automatically indicate
intention or meaning.
The second element underpinning Sharkfeed is rephotography, a term I borrow
from a project realised by Klett, Manchester, and Verburg in 1984. Rephotography is a
deliberate repetition of a photographic act to learn more about a specific event in real
time and space represented by the act. Edmund Husserl once argued that a historical
moment is a “fact” (en fait or unicite, as Derrida translated it) and that such a moment,
as an experience, is unique. Rephotography recites Derrida’s critique of Husserl’s
phenomenology and is a methodology that harbours at its core an idea that “the non-
repeatable fact must have in principle brought into history what can be wilfully and
indefinitely repeated” (Derrida, cited by Lawler, 2001). If we accept Derrida’s proposi-
tion, rephotography, as a technique, may be seen as a way to create a paradoxical situ-
ation whereby a wilfully repeated act becomes a way of (re)apprehending a unique
historical moment over and again.
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As stated above, Sharkfeed was not conceived to tell the absolute, authoritative ver-
sion of the real or unique story surrounding Graeme Thorne’s kidnap. What it sets out
to do is to gain greater insight into the event and how the kidnap influenced and con-
tinues to reflect Australian society.
Turning again to the Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (Bullock et al., 1988,
pp. 406-407, 724, 824, 825), we learn that conventional psychoanalytic theory (such as
that developed around screen theory) suggests that, as spectators, we identify with the
subject through our sense of an imaginary (self) situated in the symbolic (culture or so-
ciety). But the sense of identification with our imaginary subject is lost when the ac-
tual impinges and disrupts our expectations of what the real ought to be. Looked at in
this way, Thorne’s kidnapping disturbs us when we see how things can turn so quickly
from a dreamed-of lottery win in June 1960 to the dreadful realisation that the tragic
loss of a young child’s life weeks later was a direct result of that win. In psychoanalytic
terms, this leads to a loss of control in the face of an unknown other who threatens the
subject’s stability and sense of reality. At an immediate, material level, Graeme
Thorne’s death does exactly that.
Sharkfeed offers other ways of identifying (with) the subject, however. Suggested by
his virtual presence, Graeme Thorne may be considered to be still present today, at
least at the edges of our cultural fears and imaginings, making us realise that we (too)
are captives in (our) time that now coexists with the envelope of Graeme’s life. Henri
Bergson’s philosophy of time, space, and virtual coexistence is useful in understand-
ing what might be happening here (see Deleuze, 1991).
Consequently, it might be argued that who has really been lost in Graeme Thorne’s
kidnap is Istvan Baranyay, the man transformed from a (Jewish-Hungarian) World
War II survivor who migrated to Australia in March 1950 to become a shady, cor-
rupted figure named Stephen Lesley Bradley, Thorne’s kidnapper. Strictly speaking,
Bradley is a man whose place in history can never be redeemed. But the same may not
be true of Istvan Baranyay. Yet still, (Baranyay) Bradley also lives on, forever captive in
his cell of time.
Does this “relativisation” cheapen, lessen, or reduce the reality of Thorne’s or
Bradley’s lives, not to mention all the others who were sucked into the vortex of events
that wintry June day? Not really! Not if they are remembered for who they really were.
But Sharkfeed rejected the voice of absolute authority to link its narrative of observ-
able, material objects and events with the real. How can I now claim to really talk about
those people? This is where rephotography comes in.
Rephotographing an event is like tracing out the footsteps of one’s progenitors and
forces us to recall that they, like us, existed in a spatio-cultural network, an envelope
of social time, which actualised their extraordinary, if sometimes tragic, lives. Now, we
might remember that our lives are also surrounded by a large blanket, a big sleep as
Shakespeare put it, an oblivion of matrices and spatio-temporal coordinates that cra-
dles (our) existence.
Thus, remembering who those people really were means remembering who we re-
ally are as well. Stripped bare of our fear of them as our unknown other, we can now
remember them because we recognise that they are also us, or could have been any-
way, anywhere, anytime. If we can agree on this, then we can agree that although ma-
terial causality does not automatically indicate intention or meaning, this does not
mean that intention and meaning are absent either. We can imagine others’ intentions
and the meaning of their actions by imagining ourselves in their time-space locations.
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Mixing Realities: New and Old Media
Sharkfeed could have been realised in the older medium of photography as I had al-
ready done with The Holtermann Rephotographs (Grech, 1989, 2000). Yet there are as-
pects of such a work—and the idea of living in hybrid realities—that are accentuated
and better realised through new technology. New media help dissolve distinctions be-
tween memory and matter, imaginary and real, self and other and (re)turn memory
and imaginary into matter, past and future into present, mind and spirit into body.
Thus, things that
once seemed mutu-
ally exclusive, po-
larised, and op-
posed, or things
that once appeared
to cancel each
other, are resituated
in a state of expec-
tant suspension.
Together, such old
binary warhorses
become the ani-
mating cohabitors
of a new ontologi-
cal state accommo-
dating the social
particularities and
cultural practices
engendered by the
time spaces in a
digital era. Here,
past and present
are actualised to-
gether as alternate futures in a way people have long dreamt about doing but have
been unable to materially achieve—until quite recently. In doing so, the nature of
mind and body have changed. How new media, which is still in its infancy, is achiev-
ing this is yet to be fully understood.
Sharkfeed combines visual and other material to actualise an imaginary past sus-
pended with/in a knowing present by
1. mixing material from different eras, genres, levels, and modalities (e.g., documentary
television footage with art photography, social history with contemporary speculation
and invention, science and technology with popular folklore, and newspaper clippings
with official records);
2. mixing a number of discursive strategies (narrative, descriptive, evocative, and inter-
pretive); and
3. mixing media (images, writing, sound).
As predictable as these strategies may seem, sometimes the most obvious move is
exactly what is needed for the predisposition in contemporary Western culture to
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Figure 1. The eye, the camera, and the hand combined in searching the me-
tropolis for Graeme Thorne in Sharkfeed. Photographic fragments by John
Grech (1990). Archival footage Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1960).
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measure and oppose notions of past and present, self and other, here and there, real-
ity and fantasy. The thought that Graeme Thorne and Stephen Lesley Bradley do not
coexist with/in us now is one example of how binary thinking still dominates our
culture.
New media in general, and projects like Sharkfeed in particular, destabilise concep-
tions of past and present by using materials and techniques (photography, documen-
tary, evidence) that normally confirm the logics of binary conventions and then play-
fully suspend (dis)belief at the (im)possibility of these constructions. This subverts, or
at least challenges, attempts to explain the world through materialist science and ra-
tionalism alone based on assuming that only what is quantified and measured mate-
rially has the power to “explain” why things are the way they are. That tradition of bi-
nary thinking discredits other, sometimes fantastic, accounts of how things might
really be.
The binary opposition of past and present, documentary record, and fictional text
points to the fundamental distinction between illusion and reality that Plato was at
pains to point out in his Simile of the Cave. Aristotle complimented this idea by
adding that the foundational mean (the golden mean) of a rational philosophy of na-
ture (see also Koestler, 1968) is a science measured by the (human) body. As Kenneth
Clark (1990) put it, by the time of the Renaissance, “man [became] the measure of all
things” (pp. 89-116). Yet if scientific reality is ideally measured by and through the
body, since the Renaissance, Western culture has devised ever more elaborate tech-
nologies that complement and extend the capabilities of the body.
Beyond the Binary
In the secret agreement between past and present the body of history, the history
of the body . . . history as body, breaks into the past in order to re-configure and
em-body the present in an ontological interruption.
—Iain Chambers “Maps, Movies, Musics, and Memory,” 1997, p. 236)
Today, it is Plato’s cave that is looking more like an illusion, the foundation of a
(false) epistemology that denies a contiguous ontology by asserting that there is a fun-
damental dichotomy between illusion and reality, matter and imaginary, mind and
body. To the Aboriginal spirit alive in Claude Levi-Strauss’s (1979) mind, the separa-
tion between material reality (truth) and imaginary myth (illusion) is nothing but bad
voodoo, a self-deluding promulgation that leads Western thinkers to exercise power
over matter through science and technology based on a half-hearted (i.e., mental) un-
derstanding of what matter actually is. This form of binary thinking is a way of alien-
ating and excluding the self from the other.
Lawrence Grossberg (1996) has argued that the process of other-ing is actually one
of the fundamental “logics of modernity.” For Grossberg, other-ing is about making
distinctions with/in objects and events that fragment identifications over time and
space. Modernity, according to Grossberg, “never constitutes itself as an identity (dif-
ferent from others) but as a difference” (p. 93). Grossberg concluded that modernity
thus makes the self experience itself as being different—from itself—across time and
space. This binary-isation of self as other is possible through modern technologies:
Temporal technologies such as clocks, photography, and cinema realise the passage of
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time, making distinctions between who and what we are “now” in relation to who and
what we were “then”; spatial technologies such as trains, cars, and planes realise move-
ment and space and highlight differences of “being here” and “being there.”
If other-ing is one facet of alienation, and alienation one facet of modernity, this
helps explain the intense interest in nomadology, migration, exile, and mobility as
modern thinkers try to understand the impact of modernisation. And, if the engine of
modernity is capitalism (the grand economic theory that envelopes the world today)
and the technologies (modes of production) it engenders, isn’t new media complicit
in further alienating us? I will return to the question of alienation later, but for the
moment I want to consider some possible theoretical moves to answer this question.
Extending the Body—Expanding the Screen
One way is to argue that new media, as a means of instantaneous communication
through time space, allow us to “be” in several places at once. This could lead to a ro-
mantic conclusion that new media actualise a “holisitic” ontology represented by an
“indigenous” capacity to “be” simultaneously here and there, in myth and science,
spirit and matter, mind and body, past and present. Following this line of thought,
new media can be seen not to alienate us but rather engender new continuities be-
tween mind, body, and soul.
There may be other ways of approaching this question that take us beyond the
body, though. These seek to conceptualise new paradigms for a nonembodied (that is,
neither disembodied yet not embodied or reembodied either) theorisation of the re-
alities engendered by new media. Such realities signal a transition from the experience
of being in front of the screen to being with the screen—what Thomas Elsaesser
dubbed as the “different modalities created by the mobility of the cinematic appara-
tus.”2 Elsaesser’s comment suggested to me that the spectator’s experience, once de-
pendent on be(com)ing totally disembodied (becoming mind) in a timeless nowhere-
ness inside a cinema, has transmigrated with new media. This transmigration has
generated new modes of extended (dis)embodied being.
To avoid confusion, I will distinguish my use of the term (dis)embodied from film
theorists such as Torben Grodal’s (1997, 2000) use of it. Historically, the experience of
watching a film in a cinema allowed the spectator to leave his or her (troubled) world
behind. (This is why going to the movies became popular during the Great Depres-
sion.) Yet leaving that world behind necessitated leaving the body there too. Film the-
orists’ notion of the disembodied certainly helps explain the importance of comfort-
able seating, soundproofing, and the exclusion of sun and other light sources from
movie theatres, all in the name of facilitating the spectators’ total entry (immersion)
into the make-believe world of the screen.
Translocated into bedroom, study, workplace, classroom, becoming immersed in
the screen is no longer dependent on the viewers’ total denial of (their) bodily experi-
ence (as disembodied spectators). Instead, there is now a fusion of sensual informa-
tion, partly derived from technology (image, text, sound) and partly from the physi-
cal location of the body (what the spectator hears, sees, smells, tastes, touches, and
feels). This new experience is “being” engendered as new media extends the body by
expanding the screen. Imagine walking along the street with a Walkman on, and sud-
denly, the experience of the street combines with the music so that the whole situation
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takes on the appearance of a cinematic experience. This is one sort of an expanded
screen experience, yet as Chambers (1990) pointed out, it still remains “above all, an
intensely private experience” (p. 1).
Where once mediated experiences such as cinema depended on locking out the rest
of the world, the reengagement of the body’s senses by new technology becomes an-
other element in an existential plane where an extended ontological experience is nei-
ther purely biological (derived solely from the senses of the body) nor purely techno-
logical (derived from the computer or the Walkman). This new sense of being depends
on the in(ter)vention of a technological device that displaces sensory data or infor-
mation, which then creates an ontological fusion between body and technology. This
fusion may be characterised as comprising
1. primary sensory data derived from the concrete physicality of our embodiment and
2. secondary (analogue) and tertiary (digital) data derived through the body’s senses but
originating in technologies that displace information as well as creating new virtual en-
vironments (read also representation or simulacra).3
The implications of these ontological shifts and the epistemological paradigms they
engender are enormous. But does this mean that we finally are able to accommodate
the invisible, ghostly worlds around us? Can these worlds remain or return to the con-
fined, mutually exclusive domains of real and imaginary, present and absent, then and
now? Conjoined together through new media, can these hitherto mutually exclusive
realms dissolve distinctions between mind and body, self and other? How are these
changes affecting our sense of reality, identity, and community?
Such questions are not new in themselves, but they are highlighted by new tech-
nology, and just posing them challenges the foundations of how we continue to relate
to (know) each other. What is even more disturbing is that, with the promise of an on-
going process of modernisation, technological innovation, and development, such
questions reveal that we will never be able to bed down with a single epistemological
paradigm again. The theorisation of new media may founder, therefore, in its own
childhood, as future technologies swamp the present and shake the ground under its
emergent discourse. Ours truly is a present that is flooded by future as well as past
possibilities.
Sounding the Body
There is another side of this story that is disquieting though, for let us not forget
that Graeme Thorne was a real living boy—a finite human body. There is a danger, in
all this speculation, that we might yet forget that, as bodies, we still exist in real time
and real space. Can the fusion of body sensation with technological s(t)imulation lead
to the (re)creation of a cyber monster, an ever-mutating body (knowledge/being) that
is constantly undergoing (technological) expansion to return it to the world un-
scathed? Or will the vanity of the living try to preserve the body at an imaginary peak,
even if it means dispensing with more and more of what remains of this body (mem-
ory) as it gets older? Putting it another way, what does it do to our sense of reality to
see (or to imagine) Graeme Thorne alive on a Bondi street in 1997?
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Reconsidering
sound may be helpful
in dealing with this
problem, not as a new
metaphor to articulate
older rationalisations
but as another way to
remember the body.
Here, it might be sug-
gested, Sharkfeed may
be a little underplayed.
For although sound
may indeed help to
move the spectator’s
eye across the screen, its
erratic deployment in
this project means that
it only occasionally
breaks into the visual
and written diegesis of the work. In part, this was a problem with producing sound on
the Web—the present limitations of sound software, code, and Internet delivery, not
to mention the unknown users’ capacity at the other end, made it impossible for any
but a rudimentary use of sound. This was further complicated by requirements from
ABC (a public broadcaster) that the site remain accessible to those with slower Inter-
net connections and older computers and software. Yet the failure to accommodate
that extra something that sound might have contributed to Sharkfeed and what that
might have achieved does not mean that it is not possible to consider or envisage
where sound might have taken it.
That extra something is what Chambers (1997) has termed the excess capacity of
sound to interrupt a sutured past invented by a rational, ordered vision of it by and in
the present. For Chambers, sound can act like an unexpected comma or full stop, mak-
ing him aware of the artificiality of the rational constructions of vision as a primary
apparatus for a mental-rational world. If, in Western culture, vision is as dominant as
people claim, then sound may usefully disrupt this imag(in)ed field. Sound may un-
seat a calm, controlling eye by acting like a stalker coming at it from the side, leaving
it desperately sweating under its own spot light, caught in the prison of its own frame.
With hindsight, might it not be better said that, in spite of itself, this is precisely what
the erratic, unpredictable placement of the sound in Sharkfeed does? Now we may get
really excited, as the sound opens up the screen to ways of looking, seeing, knowing
not previously considered.
Yet we are confronted by another problem! Sound can also suture a discomforting
textual vista by taming a unsympathetic editorial cut, an unexpected visual clue, or a
jarring narrative jump that seems to lead nowhere. Sound itself is not devoid of (its)
forms of rationality. This brings us back to some basic questions: What is the objec-
tive of making such a work? Is it to represent life? Is it to present a machine as if it were
alive? Or is this machine working to service life, to make life more viable by remem-
bering a body that continues to live on within-without the machinic apparatus?
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Figure 2. Graeme Thorne walking the streets of Sydney again!?
Photograph by John Grech (1997). Archival footage Australian
Broadcasting Corporation (1960).
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Conclusion—Living With the Dead
I started this article by recounting some thoughts after reading Lefort’s reflections
on Merleau-Ponty’s death. Death suggests silence, invisibility, emptiness, loss—words
that arouse great interest and emotion. But does that mean that life and death become
a string of words (signs)? The death of Merleau-Ponty brought a sense of silence,
emptiness, loss, and invisibility to Claude Lefort, but now that Merleau-Ponty’s words
are the only signs I have, has he become just a set of signs in my mind? What do such
signs take and make in me? An imaginary Merleau-Ponty? A sense of “being” in time
and space that no longer is? Yes, but also a time and space that never really existed be-
fore I imagined it, just like these words make spaces where you and I may imagine each
other where once we could not. Yet beyond this, in the shadow of these words are the
empty actual spaces that you and I constantly reoccupy in living out our lives. Is this
the case for Merleau-Ponty?
New technology may overcome such binaries by merging the virtual and the real.
For example, spectacular digital effects have allowed directors to complete films even
after their starring actors have died. New media also enable people to communicate
over great distances instantaneously, perhaps even through the veil of death. Yet peo-
ple criticise technology for alienating us from ourselves, from who and what we are.
But what if alienation is not really a condition derived from technology or modernity?
What if alienation is one of life’s contradictions and is, therefore, ontological, “hold-
ing us prisoner in the time of our ‘being’?” as Chambers (1997, p. 236) argued? If
alienation is indeed ontological, this means it may not be just the outcome of bad bi-
nary oppositions. Some things like death and life are actually antithetical yet also in-
separably connected, a continuum that moves us gradually from beings in identical
singularities into states of actual difference. The state of being (dead or alive) is thus
more than just a binary operation, more than just a string of words and signs. Alien-
ation is not just a result of modern technology or the way we think (language) we
know (epistemology) the world but is seated in our state of being (ontology).
Chambers (1994, pp. 117-118) elsewhere argued that performing “ourselves” trans-
forms us into actors, authors, and creators. From this position, may we not now begin
to conclude, heretofore, that Graeme Thorne and Stephen Lesley Bradley may have re-
ally been just bad actors, sad performers who actualised only the tragic possibilities
presented by the architectures of their lives, their envelopes of space time?
Returning to the future, the writer of this script in writing, the “I” also finds itself
“being” rewritten, as we (reader and writer) struggle to come to terms with what
Graeme Thorne and Stephen Bradley, as well as Merleau-Ponty, left (us) behind. Me-
diating such possibilities, arguably what new media do best, allows us to perform not
so much as binaries but rather as potentialities. But like all new positions, these must
be realised by someone acting them out. In so doing, we will have to learn to live with
the dead!
Notes
1. Wobbegong Productions is a company I established with Sarah Lambert, whom I intro-
duced into the project in mid-1998 as designer and progammer to complete the production
team.
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2. I wish to thank Thomas Elsaesser for clarifying these thoughts and especially in the dis-
cussion that arose with Gertrude Koch after a lecture titled “Cinema and Architecture,” which
she gave on May 4, 2001, at the University of Amsterdam.
3. I wish to thank Kate Sparke Richards for making the distinctions between primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary information for me.
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